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Abstract 
Created as a result of the need for increased national security and information sharing 
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, fusion centers are in a unique position to 
promote homeland security cooperation and partnership between the federal, regional, state, 
local, and tribal levels. The National Network of Fusion Centers is the Department of 
Homeland Security’s primary conduit for information sharing at all levels of the government 
and is comprised of 78 state, local, and tribal cells that developed independently and 
spontaneously, and as a result, are at different levels of maturation.  
While the uniqueness of each of these cells has been championed by the government 
as a custom-tailored fit to the unique needs of each state or locality, the residual effects of 
their lack of integration and common framework creates widespread inefficiencies that could 
be resolved with more engagement from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) to direct oversight and enterprise capacity, mission integration, national security 
partnerships, and strategy and engagement. This paper will analyze some of the key National 
Network inefficiencies with regards to overall National Network strategy, intelligence 
effectiveness, vertical and horizontal collaboration, and accountability and oversight, and 
how the ODNI could address these issues according to their structural organization and past 
successes within the intelligence community (IC). 
Keywords: Fusion centers, National Network, Director of National Intelligence, Department 
of Homeland Security 
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Fixing Fusion Center Intelligence Under the ODNI 
Findings by the 9/11 Commission and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 identified a breakdown in information sharing between 
various government agencies as a main reason for the failure to prevent the September 11, 
2001 attacks. This ushered in a wave of reforms to fortify homeland defense and security. A 
major part of the reform effort was the creation of a decentralized Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE) to strengthen cooperation between agencies and boost the ability to 
detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate future large-scale terrorist attacks. Thus, the 
National Network of Fusion Centers was born.  
Sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), yet owned and operated 
by state and local jurisdictions, the National Network of Fusion Centers, also known as the 
“National Network,” is comprised of 78 fusion centers that conduct rapid analysis of critical 
law enforcement data and information to provide actionable intelligence at the federal, state, 
local, and tribal level. No two fusion centers are the same. For instance, fusion center size 
can range from a three-person office to expansive centers like the Northern California 
Regional Intelligence Center with 250 or more people amassed from the highway patrol, state 
department of justice, FBI, local and state emergency management agencies, local law 
enforcement, and public health. Similarly, each fusion center has matured independently and 
spontaneously over the years and many have expanded their roles to encompass more than 
just terrorist threats. This flexibility, decentralization, and ability to leverage regional-
specific expertise for unique local problem sets have been praised by the federal government 
as value-added fusion center characteristics.  
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However, fusion centers as a whole continue to face increasing challenges and 
criticism as a result of their constant state of flux and inefficiencies created from a lack of 
standardization, common framework, or oversight. While the United States has not faced 
another foreign terrorist attack since 9/11, there has been a rise in successful domestic attacks 
in recent years, to include the Little Rock recruiting station and Fort Hood shootings of 2009, 
the Boston marathon bombing of 2013, and the San Bernardino attack in 2015. Even in late 
2019, the country has experienced shootings in El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio at the 
beginning of August, and Odessa and Midland, Texas and the Minnesota State Fair during 
Labor Day weekend. Critics of the current National Network structure cite a lack of 
oversight, a non-standardized intelligence process, structural and organizational issues, and a 
lack of policy and strategy.  
Currently, fusion centers are supported day-to-day by the State and Local Fusion 
Center (SLFC) Program under DHS, assigned by the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
Analysis (I&A). The State and Local Program Office (SLPO) is the lead for supporting the 
National Network, and this office works with the Privacy Office for Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties (CRCL), the DHS Office of the Inspector General, and the Office of General 
Counsel. It is charged with ensuring compliance with Congressional directives and 
appropriate regulations (Homeland Security Intelligence Council, 2016). The SLPO 
organizes personnel support, budget development and execution, and coordination with other 
agencies. Information sharing, analytical support, and other intelligence functions are 
coordinated by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) (Concept of Operations, 
2008). 
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While I&A is charged with integrating intelligence through all components of DHS 
through the deliverance of intelligence to the state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT), and 
private sector components of fusion centers, the Program Manager for the Information 
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) leads ISE and information stewardship efforts that led to the 
creation of the National Network. PM-ISE is located in the Partner Engagement directorate 
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). However, challenges with 
sharing information among fusion centers remain and more can be done by the ODNI to 
address these issues. Further, many of the other issues afflicting the efficiency of the National 
Network that this paper will address may be resolved through other ODNI directorates who 
already focus on resolving similar issues within the national intelligence community (IC).  
This paper will use document analysis to examine some of the major challenges that 
fusion centers are faced with. It will then apply knowledge of the functions and roles of the 
various departments within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to see 
how those fusion center issues could potentially be addressed. Doing so will demonstrate 
how an authority with ODNI-type functions should be created under DHS to address those 
issues. The National Network might benefit from the creation of functions mirrored after 
ODNI directorates or mirrored after ODNI successes within the IC, to address these 
widespread inefficiencies throughout the National Network, specifically when it comes to 
lack of standardized strategy, intelligence effectiveness, vertical and horizontal collaboration, 
and intelligence oversight and accountability.  
Lack of Standardized Fusion Center Strategy 
 The National Network has been championed for its foundation on the pillars of 
flexibility, decentralization, and ability to provide subject matter expertise for problem sets 
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particular to each locality. According to Fussell et al. (2009), these pillars allow fusion 
centers and other similar organizations such as joint task forces to respond rapidly. The 
absence of these pillars, specifically flexibility and decentralization, is what, for instance, led 
to the failure of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responding in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Fussell et al., 2009). DHS established a centralized 
command and control approach onto FEMA when the organization was reorganized under 
DHS. The removal of FEMA’s ability to maximize power at the lowest level is a frequent 
criticism (Perrow, 2005). 
Because of the National Network’s unique structure, DHS established a loose 
framework for state and local fusion centers to follow through the Interaction with State and 
Local Fusion Centers Concept of Operations (CONOPS, 2008). This CONOPS is intended 
to provide transparency into DHS support for fusion centers as directed by PM-ISE. Further, 
the National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers (2014) sets the vision for 
the National Network, connecting states and localities together as a national information-
sharing asset by integrating the capabilities of law enforcement and the IC. Further, the 
Fusion Center Guidelines (FCG, 2006) was written to serve as foundational guidance for 
establishing consistent, more uniform fusion center operations to enhance coordination and 
antiterrorism capabilities. 
 However, these government publications have proven to be difficult in application 
and enforcement across the entire National Network. For example, while the CONOPS and 
the National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers are sufficient first-step 
sources in creating a National Network framework, they stop short of defining common 
agreement on what fusion centers should be, a standardized process for the National Network 
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to operate, vectors for future progress, or even a plan to get there. Similarly, The Fusion 
Center Guidelines provides just that—ambiguous and open-ended guidelines to get to a 
baseline capability, without providing the actual framework needed to resolve National 
Network inconsistencies (Ladich, 2018). As explained by Pherson and Sullivan (2013), the 
guidelines are like giving fusion centers the recipe and ingredients, but not the institutional 
knowledge, to build effective fusion centers from scratch. But perhaps the issue with creating 
an all-inclusive national strategy is more complex. The championed variations in individual 
fusion center operations makes it challenging to create an all-encompassing framework, 
strategy, measures of effectiveness, oversight policy, and more that can be detailed enough to 
address varied state privacy laws, yet remain flexible enough for nationwide application 
(Harper, 2009).   
 Strategy and guidance are complementary for successful fusion center operations. In 
order for fusion centers to run effectively, personnel should have a clear idea of the mission 
and standards of the fusion center they work for (Nenneman, 2008). However, many fusion 
center personnel are not aware of the mission or their purpose in their workplace, degrading 
the effectiveness of the center as a whole (Office of Personnel Management, 2014). When 
mission and objectives are poorly defined, measures of effectiveness and resulting success 
cannot be defined or captured, either. This lack of clear mission guidance may be due to a 
lack of leadership at various levels to clearly articulate a strategy and what is expected of a 
fusion center (Fussell et al., 2009). “Any fusion center void of standardization and/or an 
unclear, unfocused mission, essentially lends itself not only to criticism, but almost 
guarantees for itself weakened or one-sided partnerships with other organizations in the IC” 
(Salvatore, 2018, p. 79).  
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This is demonstrated in the way various fusion centers operate according to their own, 
non-standardized intelligence missions (Carter et al., 2012). Fusion centers were initially 
created to execute a counterterrorism capability in support of DHS’ homeland security 
efforts. While the standing information needs of DHS were supposed to form the base for 
information collection activities, “the failure to effectively mobilize the Department’s 
extensive domestic intelligence collection capability to fill the intelligence gap has left it 
without a recognized leadership role among its most obvious customers—state, local and 
tribal law enforcement—as well as other federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies” 
(Gomez, 2013, p. 23). This unfilled role, and the fact that fusion centers are owned, operated, 
and funded by the state, has promoted the current trend of many fusion centers strategically 
adopting a less uniform and broader, all-threats and all-hazards focus, as well as a law 
enforcement-centric focus to secure state funding and support and satisfy the law 
enforcement efforts dominant at their operating level.  
At the initial implementation of the National Network, DHS provided $300 million to 
help fusion centers build baseline capabilities. Since then, post-9/11 federal funding has been 
inconsistent and dwindling. Fusion center critics argue that the National Network does not 
provide enough of an impact to the federal counterterrorism effort to justify greater federal 
spending (Devine, 2014), and that there is not a sufficient level of counterterrorism activity in 
some areas to warrant having a fusion center (Peteritas, 2013). As a result, fusion centers 
struggle to maintain financial backing, with the majority of their financial support being 
provided by the states. Without a clear strategy and vision, it is apparent how funding can 
blur the line between the interests of the national government and those of the states, who 
operate with contrasting information needs to include local crime waves, gangs, drugs, 
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human trafficking, natural disasters, and all other broader issues affecting their state absent of 
terrorism (Salvatore, 2018). As more fusion centers become influenced to modify to a much 
wider, all-threats and all-hazards approach to attain local public and private buy-in, this 
blurring of lines for responsibilities and functions dilutes the ability to support the federal 
counterterrorism mission, the original core competency of the fusion center effort that never 
really materialized.   
Over the years, DHS has trended toward a more all-encompassing approach to adopt 
a more prevention-focused stance, but not all state and local fusion centers have made that 
same move. According to The National Network of Fusion Centers’ 2017 Final Report, two 
of 77 fusion centers identified their scope as solely counterterrorism, while 50 fusion centers 
identified with a counterterrorism, all-crimes and all-hazards approach. Five fusion centers 
identified as solely using an all-crimes approach, while one fusion center identified solely 
with an all-hazards focus. The rest of the fusion centers identified with a focus of either just 
all-crimes and all hazards, just counterterrorism and all-crimes, or just counterterrorism and 
all-hazards.  
For those that have expanded to include an all-crimes or all-hazards approach in an 
official or de facto manner, the interpretation and application of the terms all-crimes and all-
hazards varies between fusion centers, leading to more confusion than fusion. In addition to 
counterterrorism efforts, all-threats intelligence may or may not include large or small, petty 
or violent crimes to include gang activity, drug trafficking, human smuggling, or other 
criminal activity depending on the particular issues a locality is faced with. Some fusion 
centers experience an emerging trend of all-hazards intelligence subcategories, such as fire, 
critical infrastructure, natural disasters, public health, or any other non-criminal emergency 
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(Carter, 2009). As a result of these variances, these fusion centers identify a need to bring in 
various private or public stakeholders, such as the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) 
and/or Emergency Medical Services (EMS) to round out their mission.  
There are many reasons for incorporating a wider purpose. Doing so allows fusion 
centers to apply for a greater number of non-federal grants or other funding resources, such 
as DHS’ non-disaster, preparedness grants, offered by FEMA to state, local, and tribal 
governments (Department of Homeland Security, 2018). A wider purpose also helps fusion 
centers better align with regional and local priorities, which may be more prevalent than a 
terrorist threat. However, these efforts leave fusion centers serving different priorities that 
have proven to be less than harmonious when it comes to feeding the federal 
counterterrorism mission. 
There is no guidance or vision for what the long-term role of the federal government 
will be in maintaining these centers (Larence, 2007). The United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security takes a position that formally 
standardizing all aspects of fusion centers would be disadvantageous. Yet at the same time, 
the report states that the lack of a comprehensive strategy prevents the National Network 
from reaching its full potential and that a strategy is needed to “explain how and why the 
federal government engages with fusion centers, guide federal planning, serve as the 
foundation to develop additional performance and value based metrics, and drive federal 
resource allocation to fusion centers” (2013, p.v). The National Network of Fusion Centers 
Final Report (2017) does analyze fusion center performance, but the metrics used for the 
assessment are based off previous year’s performance instead of objectives derived from 
official strategy and guidance. A number of other reports (Department of Homeland Security, 
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Officer of the Inspector General, 2011; House Homeland Security Committee, 2017; Rollins, 
2018) suggest that a national strategy be made to guide coordination and support. In addition, 
the National Network would benefit from an intelligence authority maintaining 
accountability of the strategy as well as holding the National Network accountable according 
to an agreed-upon metric that is constant with time. 
Intelligence Product Effectiveness 
Just as much as the absence of a standardized fusion center strategy muddies the 
understanding of where intelligence priorities should lie, it also makes it difficult to ensure 
fusion center customers receive timely, relevant, and effective intelligence products. 
According to the latest National Network of Fusion Centers final report (2017), 86 percent of 
fusion center customers believe products—which range from situational awareness products 
to officer safety bulletins, strategic pieces on gangs, terrorist groups, drugs, and more—are 
relevant, a three percent drop from 2016; and 83 percent believe products are timely. While 
these self-reported DHS numbers seem high, a number of reports and publications question 
the relevance and effectiveness of fusion centers and the products they create.  
A United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations report (2012) 
indicated an estimated 85 percent of Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs) were of no 
benefit to any entity, from the IC to fusion centers and their customers. Further, despite hefty 
funding through taxpayer dollars, fusion centers were not being effective at doing their job, 
and possibly producing flawed reports that “do not meet the reporting threshold” nor 
“provide benefit to the IC” (p. 33). In one example, the investigation subcommittee expressed 
amazement at the poor quality of one HIR that warned readers of a certain automobile, which 
had folding rear seats to make the trunk accessible, would be beneficial to human traffickers, 
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criticizing the report for stating common knowledge of a feature that is offered in numerous 
car makes and models. Other examples of HIRs, to include a meth lab bust run by a person 
who claimed to be affiliated with a white supremacist group and a U.S. Army translator who 
was a passenger in a car accident, had no relevance to any sort of homeland security mission. 
Another HIR that focused on retelling a Mexican news story about an ambulance that 
declined to transport a drug violence victim to the hospital, appeared to contain solely open 
source information and no intelligence. 
A possible reason for the lack of relevance of fusion center intelligence reports is the 
lack of a substantive intelligence analysis training program and certification process for 
fusion center personnel. Analysts working at fusion centers come from various backgrounds, 
including law enforcement, recent university graduates, crime analysts, IC analysts, 
targeteers, seasoned military personnel, clerks, and more. Homogenizing analysts according 
to Federal analytic standards increase the efficacy of fusion center capabilities and provides 
opportunity for personnel to advance their analytic tradecraft. Further, according to the 
House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security’s Majority Staff Report on the 
National Network of Fusion Centers (2013), fusion center analyst career paths help to grow 
and retain talent and develop personnel into future fusion center leaders. Since then, DHS 
and ODNI laid out common analyst competencies needed to meet challenges at work 
designed to be aligned with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 610, Annex G, Core 
Competencies for Intelligence Analysis and Production (Pherson & Sullivan, 2013). In 
addition, critical thinking, analytical methods and principles of intelligence writing and 
briefing training modules and workshops were created to enhance fusion center operations at 
all levels. Further, the National Fusion Centers of America has hosted annual training for 
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fusion center employees to address issues facing fusion centers since 2013 (Ladich, 2018). 
However, this training is not mandatory, and therefore cannot be used as a certification 
program to set a standardized baseline. Finally, the FBI hosts intelligence analyst training to 
include an analytic writing course. However, these courses are offered to FBI analysts and 
not fusion center analysts writ large. The FBI also does not include and training in the 
Analyst Professional Development Roadmap (Global Advisory Committee, 2015). In 
addition, rigorous evaluation of training for law enforcement intelligence seems to be absent 
(Dorn, 2019) and not a clear responsibility of a governing intelligence body. 
Fusion center analysts also have an extremely vague understanding of the 
organizational and geographic audiences that they are creating intelligence products for. 
Lewandowski’s survey of fusion center analysts (2017) hinted to a disconnection between 
analysts and end-users receiving fusion center products via a LISTSERV. According to 
Lewandowski, while half of the analysts created products disseminated on LISTSERVs 
intended for law enforcement, there was still an inability to identify who exactly the end-
users were. LISTSERVs instead seemed to be an “amalgamation of different sectors rather 
than a more precise assessment of all relevant stakeholders” (p. 23), to include fire, EMS, 
law enforcement, and even schools and universities, making it difficult to assess the people 
that comprised the subscription. Even then, the possibility existed that recipients of emails 
with information that did not pertain to them would divest in future emails from that fusion 
center altogether.  
Contributing to the inability for analysts to create tailored, relevant products for their 
intended customers is the lack of a feedback mechanism, which is traditionally seen in the IC 
intelligence cycle and a major part of the intelligence process. Product feedback allows for 
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analysts to customize products more maximum efficacy. In Lewandowski’s survey (2017), 
35 percent of analysts interviewed indicated they have never received product feedback from 
their customers, other analysts, or even their supervisors. In addition, feedback was almost 
never received from law enforcement, the majority stakeholder in fusion center products. A 
large majority of analysts expressed the feedback they did receive was minimal and not 
constructive. Analysts have attempted to seek feedback through the creation of product 
surveys, but as one analyst pointed out, “it may go out to 1,000 people, we may get one or 
two back” (Lewandowski, 2017, p. 25). While analysts maintain a proactive approach and 
desire to create more effective feedback channels, this effort may be best executed by a 
higher authority. 
Another possible reason for the lack of intelligence product relevance and 
effectiveness is a difference in the definition of intelligence between the law enforcement 
community and the national IC (Rollins 2018). The IC, which is most concerned with 
National Security Intelligence (NSI), naturally focuses on a strategic perspective to help 
inform policy makers. Strategic intelligence provides the IC with crucial information 
regarding the cultures and mindsets of terrorist organizations to provide warnings of pending 
attacks. However, this is of little tactical use to states and localities when it comes to 
preempting and preventing attacks or mitigating terrorist threats (Gomez, 2013) because 
fusion centers are looking for instant, reactive responses to continually prove their value for 
funding instead of strategic warnings that carry extended timeframes (Pherson & Sullivan, 
2013).  
 Conversely, the underpinnings of criminal intelligence in the law enforcement 
community has always focused on a tactical and investigative, or intelligence-led policing 
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perspective that is often reactive in nature, and focused on prosecution. This is evident in law 
enforcement’s use of crime analysis centers, which are the predecessors to fusion centers and 
are focused on enhancing an agency’s ability to capture criminals. For example, a crime 
analysis center reviews crime reports or other post-crime data points to determine patterns 
and similarities in the way certain crimes are committed. In doing so, they alert patrol units 
on crime patterns and trends as well as investigative leads to forecast and prevent future 
criminal activity (Gottlieb & Arenberg, 1992). This is in contrast to strategic intelligence that 
is proactive in nature and focused on addressing a policymaker’s pre-defined intelligence 
gaps (Rollins, 2008).  
Generally speaking, the more mature a fusion center is, the more integration they 
have with federal entities such as the FBI and DHS, which results in the creation of more 
strategic, joint products with greater depth in analysis, according to the Majority Staff Report 
on the National Network of Fusion Centers (2013). However, the majority of fusion centers 
seem to lack the robust analytical capability more prevalent in the IC, leaving them more 
likely to provide investigative support than critical analysis (Lewandowski, 2017). For 
example, in the Fort Dix plot of 2007, several persons were found guilty of conspiring to 
attack military personnel at Fort Dix in New Jersey. If it was not for a leaked videotape that 
was brought to a store, law enforcement may have never been able to predict the plot due to 
absence of prior criminal activity to forecast from (Rollins, 2008). Further, Rollins suggests 
an overwhelming majority of fusion centers self-identify as using a proactive approach, yet 
research indicates that they face difficulty in divorcing themselves from the reactive model 
they are accustomed to and struggle to develop a true fusion process to include “value-added 
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analysis of broad streams of intelligence, identification of gaps, and fulfillment of those gaps, 
to prevent criminal and terrorist acts” (2008, p. 22).  
Lack of Intelligence Accountability and Oversight 
Intelligence oversight is a hot topic within the IC, and therefore, for fusion centers as 
well, since they are integrated into the IC framework. Public opinion shows low levels of 
acceptance for domestic surveillance systems and high levels of desire to defend private 
information. However, even in the name of connecting the dots to prevent future terrorist 
attacks, there is a high potential for fusion centers to capture and use personal data such as 
credit cards, cell phones, the internet, and other information technology systems jointly with 
various levels of staff and private sector information sharing partners that operate on 
different privacy policies, increasing the potential for possible civil liberties abuses. Because 
the National Network is a compilation of personnel from state and local law enforcement 
entities, DHS, and FBI, there are numerous governing authorities and publications 
concerning intelligence accountability and oversight to protect privacy, civil rights and civil 
liberties (P/CRCL).  
At the highest level, the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding 
(2012) guides efforts for programs and initiatives designed to advance counterterrorism 
information sharing. Intelligence Community Directive 107 (ICD 107) (2018) establishes 
policy for the IC in protecting P/CRCL of the U.S. public. In addition, ODNI’s Information 
Sharing Environment guidelines (2018) detail how federal information can properly be 
shared with fusion centers while still protecting P/CRCL. However, in its current form, the 
guidelines are vague, focused on federal authorities, and voluntary (Rollins, 2008). Federal 
authorities for FBI information sharing are derived from the Attorney General’s Guidelines 
FIXING FUSION CENTER INTELLIGENCE UNDER THE ODNI 17 
for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection (2008), which 
grants authority for agents to “engage in proactive intelligence gathering in a manner not 
limited to investigation” (Rascoff, 2010, p.599). Oversight guidelines for DHS information 
come from the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
Intelligence Oversight Guidelines (2017).  
At lower levels, 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 23 guides state and local 
law enforcement criminal intelligence information systems in the protection of P/CRCL, but 
may be outdated as it was written prior to the creation of data-mining and storage capabilities 
(Rollins, 2018). Further, there currently is no one standalone comprehensive publication that 
promotes uniform, consistent state P/CRCL policy. However, finding a cookie-cutter 
approach to creating privacy policy for fusion centers is challenging due to state variances in 
laws, statutes, civil liberties provisions, threats, vulnerabilities, funding sources, and more.  
While the guidelines and resource framework discussed above exist, the 
implementation plan and roles and responsibilities of those charged with assessing current 
P/CRCL has yet to be determined. For example, the FCG details privacy guidelines that all 
fusion centers “have agreed” to follow, even though the guidelines are not and cannot be 
mandated by the federal government since fusion centers are a product of the state. Another 
example, the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers: A 
Supplement to the Fusion Center Guidelines (FCG) (2010), outlines five privacy 
requirements fusion centers must achieve to meet a baseline level of capability. However, 
there is no way to determine if the benchmark is being met by all fusion centers due to lack 
of an accountability mechanism. Similarly, the Fusion Center Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties Policy Development Template, Version 3.0 (2019) was created to assist fusion 
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centers in creating their own P/CRCL. However, use of the template continues to be highly 
encouraged and not mandatory; as a result, fusion centers do not have a mandatory P/CRCL 
policy. Finally, the Homeland Security Grant Program, through which the majority of the 
federal funding is provided to fusion centers, provides motivation for fusion centers to adopt 
specific privacy practices to receive federal funding, creating, maintaining, and auditing their 
own P/CRCL policy as comprehensive as ISE guidelines, ensuring all of their systems and 
processes are aligned with 28 CFR Part 23, and ensuring annual 28 CFR Part 23 training, 
among other requirements. However, the grant program initiatives stop short of creating 
mandatory P/CRCL policy for fusion centers to operate under. 
Some fusion centers have taken a proactive oversight approach, creating their own 
governance boards to serve as an oversight function. Even fewer fusion centers maintain 
highly aggressive outreach programs and methods, such as hiring a nonprofit organization to 
audit their operations, working closely with civil liberties organizations or openly inviting 
them to observe operations, explaining intelligence activities or standard operating 
procedures to the public, or appointing a representative to work in the state Attorney General 
office to address civil liberties issues. But these examples are few and far between. Harper 
explored privacy policies from three fusion centers and discovered that while some fusion 
centers openly share their information practices, others do not, and this disparity further 
exacerbates privacy and civil liberties issues. More often than not, fusion centers expressed 
that they do not need such a proactive approach because they have not received any 
complaints against them or that the state or other agencies are or should be responsible for 
those efforts (Rollins, 2008). 
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Because of the lack of oversight and accountability, the National Network has been 
likened to the establishment of a domestic intelligence agency, but without having a full 
discussion on how to protect civil rights and liberties. According to the ACLU, “we are 
granting extraordinary powers to one agency, without adequate transparency or safeguards, 
that hasn’t shown Congress that it’s ready for the job” (Rollins, 2018, p. 10). Some of the 
main concerns the ACLU has regarding fusion centers include ambiguous lines of authority 
that allow for manipulation of different regulations to evade accountability, private sector 
participation in intelligence that exacerbates privacy concerns, passive and non-passive 
wholesale data mining that threatens privacy, and excessive secrecy that prevents effective 
oversight (Harper, 2009).  
In a United States Senate Subcommittee on Investigations report (2012), investigators 
nixed more than 40 inappropriately filed reports that endangered the P/CRCL of U.S. 
citizens. In another example, a fusion center collected open source information on persons 
without proper vetting and reported the information in HIRs. Another example detailed a 
cancelled draft HIR concerning a U.S. person who was attending a mosque to give a lecture, 
but had no derogatory information on the speaker nor the mosque.  
Lack of oversight can pave the way for mission creep in analysis, with some fusion 
centers exploiting the significant leeway they have in surveillance practice versus what is 
considered normal in the traditional, non-law enforcement IC (Monahan, 2010). In one 
example of a threat assessment that lead to racial profiling, a fusion center in Virginia created 
a terrorism threat assessment based on students at historically black colleges and universities 
as posing a potential terrorist threat (Monahan, 2010). In another example, a Maryland fusion 
center conducted covert investigations of more than 53 non-violent peace and anti-death 
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penalty activists and listed them in a database as suspects of “Primary Crime: Terrorism-Anti 
Government” (Monahan, 2010, p. 89). There have also been efforts to exclude fusion centers 
from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and maintaining ambiguous lines 
between collecting and maintaining information.  
A lead role in intelligence accountability and oversight by an intelligence authority 
would prove beneficial to the National Network. Perhaps a mix of current authorities an 
ODNI’s Information Sharing Environment guidelines (2018) can provide a solid basis for 
sharing federal information with state, local and tribal fusion centers and make for a good 
starting point for already-scrutinized oversight policy. 
Lack of Vertical and Horizontal Collaboration 
The concept of a centralized state intelligence center existed prior to the creation of 
the first fusion center (Eack, 2008). Every state has operated their own central intelligence 
repository, with major cities operating individual intelligence units for various crimes. Fusion 
centers, then, can be as extensions of these intelligence units, with even greater vertical and 
horizontal collaboration. Law enforcement organizations have found it challenging to adjust 
to this new operational stance and requirement to share information up and down the chain in 
the name of homeland security. Cultural clashes are present between the law enforcement 
and intelligence communities as well as between different levels of government, and because 
of this, the relationship between federal, state, and regional partnerships is not as robust as 
the public is led to believe (MacGregor, 2010). Further, the inherent clash between the DHS 
and FBI domestic intelligence collection and counterterrorism programs is the most 
problematic (Gomez, 2013). The U.S. responded to the need for a classified domestic 
intelligence capability in a multitude of ways, including allowing the FBI to carry the 
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majority of responsibility in countering homegrown and transnational terrorism, assuming 
that law enforcement can equally substitute an intelligence role, and adding the DHS to the 
mix through the I&A as an independent intelligence collector. While the FBI is restricted by 
Executive Order 12333 for the collection of foreign intelligence in the U.S., DHS has little 
restriction when it comes to collecting domestic intelligence. Thus, problems arise when 
threat intelligence overlaps in jurisdiction. 
According to Eack (2008), the DHS and FBI have shown an unwillingness or 
inability to work together despite overlapping missions. For example, DHS has adopted the 
Los Angeles Police Department’s Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) 
as its primary database, urging all fusion centers to use this. However, the FBI maintains its 
own critical infrastructure program called Infraguard, which is popular among private 
stakeholders in some states. This rivalry has fusion centers caught between trying to balance 
support and provide information to both agencies and appeasing private stakeholders who 
own, operate, and have a vested interest in infrastructure protection. Other examples 
discussed in a report by the United States House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 
Security (2013) include the FBI withholding information and refusing to brief fusion center 
personnel on critical information as well as physically moving out of fusion center spaces 
and pulling their systems cables, preventing fusion center personnel from accessing 
important analytical capabilities and therefore, decreasing the number of combined 
intelligence products as result. This appears to be an ongoing historical trend previously 
highlighted by the 9/11 Commission and IRTPA that ushered in reforms to information 
sharing and the development of fusion centers in the first place. 
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Varying security clearance requirements between the DHS and FBI also impede 
horizontal and vertical interoperability between fusion center entities and stakeholders. 
According to a Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General report (2011), state 
and local security clearances, providing necessary access to systems and facilities, are 
sponsored by the federal government and have varying requirements per state. Because law 
enforcement professionals rarely have a security clearance higher than Law Enforcement 
Sensitive, this creates issues for law enforcement officers to perform duties because of a lack 
of accessible information (Dulin, 2009). The problem is further exacerbated due to the 
creation of new legislation that would restrict law enforcement from federal agency 
coordination, according to the House Homeland Security Committee report, Advancing the 
Homeland Security Information Sharing Environment: A Review of the National Network of 
Fusion Centers (2017). Finally, clashes between federal agencies with regards to security 
clearance issuance and acceptance create a serious impediment to analysts trying to 
collaborate vertically (Rollins, 2018). Both DHS and FBI issue all required clearances, but 
there is a significant lag in the issuance process. The issue is further aggravated due to a lack 
of agency unity, as both agencies are at times unwilling to accept each other’s security 
clearances. Enlisting an intelligence authority to standardize and regulate the creation and 
maintenance of security clearances would be beneficial. 
There are major challenges with the multitude of databases available to fusion 
centers. Some of the bigger databases fusion centers use include the Homeland Security 
Intelligence Network (HSIN), Regional Data Exchange (R-DEx), National Data Exchange 
(N-DEx), Federal Protective Service (FPS) Secure Portal, Joint Regional Information 
Exchange System (JRIES), FBINet, Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and the Regional 
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Information Sharing System (RISS). However, interviews with fusion center employees and 
institution officials in the Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General 
Report titled Information Sharing with Fusion Centers Has Improved by Information System 
Challenges Remain (2010) highlight how fusion center personnel continue to rely more on 
email communications and personal relationships to share information rather than the 
numerous intelligence sharing systems available due to the sheer number of databases and no 
way to conduct simultaneous or comprehensive searches or inputs across them. In a 
Government Accountability Office Report, Larence (2007) discovered that 31 out of 58 
fusion centers analyzed found it difficult to access federal database information, and 30 of 
those fusion centers found multiple databases to be heavily redundant. Dulin (2009) found 
that there was little cross discipline interaction between fusion center personnel and agencies 
that use fusion center intelligence, and information was being shared on an informal basis 
through personally established networks and acquaintances.  
ODNI Organization 
 Just as new as fusion centers, the ODNI was created out of the IRTPA to oversee 
operations and lead integration within a 17-organization national IC. “Today’s DNI staff 
acknowledges its principle role is to help the community solve problems that individual 
agencies are unwilling or unable to tackle alone” (Slick & Allen, 2015). Some of their 
functions to support that role include rapid fusion of domestic and foreign intelligence with 
the help of DHS and FBI to quickly understand homeland threats, strengthen information and 
intelligence sharing under ICD 501, provide Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNet) to assist fusion centers in disseminating information and establishing 
communications system with the rest of the national IC, and promoting a security clearance 
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initiative and IC badge interoperability program for the Department of State (DOS), DHS, 
and the Department of Treasury (DOT) (ODNI Fact Sheet, 2011). 
The ODNI’s organizational structure includes four mission centers: the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the 
National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), and the Cyber Threat Intelligence 
Integration Center (CTIIC). These mission centers assist the IC in coordinating intelligence 
for its four main mission areas of counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counterintelligence, 
and cyber threats, respectively. In addition to these centers, the ODNI restructured their 
organization in 2018 with the creation of four directorates, to include: Enterprise Capacity 
(EC), Mission Integration (MI), National Security Partnerships (NSP), and Strategy and 
Engagement (S&E). These directorates “support integrating intelligence; enabling national 
security partnerships; driving resources and capabilities decisions; and aligning the IC’s 
current focus with future strategy” (Clark, 2018). 
The ODNI’s Enterprise Capacity Directorate focuses on the IC’s workforce, 
technology, systems, and infrastructure to streamline processes and drive rapid, actionable 
outcomes. Their goal is to oversee and effectively utilize the DNI’s budget to reduce 
duplication and redundancy in acquisition, oversight and execution activities. Under the EC 
is the Acquisition, Procurement and Facilities Office that provides oversight to the 
intelligence acquisitions and procurement process. In addition, there is the Systems and 
Resource Analyses Office that shapes resource decisions and independent cost estimates in 
major interest and special acquisitions. Finally, ODNI utilizes the Chief Financial Officer, 
Chief Human Capital Office and Chief Information Office to lead, build and defend the IC’s 
budget, human resource strategy, and information environment.  
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The Mission Integration Directorate delivers strategic intelligence and drives resource 
allocation for various intelligence issues. This directorate serves as principle advisor to the 
DNI on all facets of intelligence. Their job is to ensure the delivery of timely, accurate, 
objective and relevant intelligence. This directorate publishes the President’s Daily Brief on 
intelligence aimed at helping the President avoid tactical surprises, craft policies, and manage 
crises. This MI is also home to the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and National 
Intelligence Management Council leading analysis across the IC as well as collective 
strategic oversight of the IC. The Mission Priorities, Analysis and Collection (MPAC) cell 
strengthens the ability to respond to intelligence priorities across a multi-intelligence and 
cross-discipline environment. They ensure the intelligence processes and people are meeting 
the needs of the analysis and collection mission areas. Finally, the Foreign Partnerships 
office works to integrate and optimize IC engagement with foreign partners, and the Election 
Threats Executive leads the IC in assessing foreign influence in U.S. elections. 
The National Security Partnerships Directorate synchronizes and coordinates IC 
outreach and defense intelligence activities among all organizations within the IC. Under this 
directorate is where the main link between ODNI and the National Network exists. The 
Federal, State, Local and Tribal (FSLT) Information Sharing Office and PM/ISE reside in 
this directorate, and are charged with delivering domestic, strategic analysis and promoting 
effective engagement throughout the federal, state and local levels of government. The 
Private Sector Office sets strategy and policy framework for private entities in order to 
mitigate risks with information sharing in an ever-evolving technological environment. The 
IC-DoD Coordination Office incorporates ODNI policy into the IC’s Department of Defense 
FIXING FUSION CENTER INTELLIGENCE UNDER THE ODNI 26 
members, and the Domain Coordination Office manages intelligence integration of mission 
activities. 
Finally, the Strategy and Engagement Directorate articulates the future path for the 
IC. This office creates strategic initiatives and transformative policy and strategy that 
addresses emerging issues and paves the way for future innovation to revolutionize the 
intelligence process. The Policy and Strategy office promotes understanding and support of 
IC programs, resources and missions, while the Office of Legislative Affairs Office sets the 
strategy and policy framework. The Strategic Communications Office focuses on clearly 
communicating the vision, direction and mission of the IC over the next 5-10 years. The 
Transformation and Innovation Office identifies emerging threats that will affect intelligence 
capabilities and addresses those threats through cross-IC innovation. Finally, the Intelligence 
Advanced Research Projects Activity Office uses groundbreaking research and development 
as well as cutting-edge technology to attain an overwhelming intelligence advantage for the 
IC.  
With regards to specific ODNI roles and functions related to homeland intelligence 
activities, ODNI created a Domestic DNI Representative role to assist coordination with Title 
50 organizations at key FBI field offices throughout the National Network. In addition, 
ODNI created a deputy position under the National Intelligence Manager (NIM) to focus on 
homeland intelligence. However, only modest efforts were made, and much still has to be 
addressed to fully utilize the capabilities of the Domestic DNI Representatives and deputy on 
homeland intelligence (Homeland Security Intelligence Council, 2016).   
ODNI Successes and National Network Role Recommendations  
FIXING FUSION CENTER INTELLIGENCE UNDER THE ODNI 27 
 The organizational roles and functions within ODNI have allowed for significant 
progress and improvements to the intelligence structure overall, paving the way for solutions 
to a variety of challenges the IC has experienced in the past that are similar to the 
inefficiencies the National Network is currently experiencing. This section explores some of 
ODNI’s solutions with regards to strategy, intelligence efficacy, intelligence oversight, and 
IC interoperability. Because of ODNI’s ability to discover solutions for the IC at the national 
level, they are primed to assist with the same challenges at the SLTT level. ODNI should 
develop a more robust role in coordination for homeland intelligence priorities and activities 
and integrating these priorities at the national level (Homeland Security Intelligence Council, 
2016).  
Addressing the Issue of Strategy 
ODNI’s Strategy and Engagement Directorate is charged with creating the National 
Intelligence Strategy (NIS), one of the most important documents for the IC as it drives 
intelligence priority and objectives for the next four years. “This strategy is based on the core 
principle of seeking the truth and speaking the truth to our policymakers and the American 
people in order to protect our country,” said former Director of National Intelligence, Dan 
Coats at the time the current NIS was released in January, 2019. The NIS comprises of four 
main foci: integration of the full talent and tools of the IC to provide the right information to 
the right people at the right time; innovation through people and technology to advance the 
IC’s highest priorities; transparency by earning the trust and faith of the public; and 
leveraging partnerships to support national security. These foci correspond well to the 
solutions needed to address the National Network inefficiencies of intelligence effectiveness, 
intelligence strategy, oversight and accountability, and vertical and horizontal collaboration.  
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ODNI’s role in defining and executing national intelligence strategy and promoting 
intelligence integration in support of that strategy demonstrates their capability to do the 
same for the National Network. A new national strategy for the domestic mission of 
counterterrorism, all-threats, and all-hazards intelligence is necessary to guide fusion centers 
with a common and uniform doctrine to mitigate homeland threats (Gomez, 2013). 
Uniformity in this doctrine is critical to setting a National Network benchmark mission and 
focus, which also sets the stage for baseline standards and regulations for a more unified 
domestic intelligence collection effort. Uniformity in standards and vision of the National 
Network is just as important as the Network’s championed decentralization, and can easily be 
created in areas that do not require changes to the law (Ladich, 2018). This new strategy 
should be defined by ODNI’s Strategy and Engagement Directorate or DHS, who owns the 
mission of protecting America, but executed by ODNI like the current national intelligence 
strategy. Important areas of agreement that fusion center personnel should be clear on, such 
as fusion center mission, philosophy, vision, intelligence strategy utilized, and collection 
priorities should be outlined in the strategy to create a common operating framework for the 
National Network mission. In addition, ODNI can strengthen the uniformity of this new 
strategy through the utilization of other guides, such as the Department of Justice’s Domestic 
Investigations and Operations Guide to ensure all fusion centers operate from the same play 
book (Gomez, 2013).  
ODNI also operationalized the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence Integration 
(DDNI/II) to serve as the single stop for collection and analysis requirements for a variety of 
priority missions within the IC. This office integrates analysis and collection of these 
requirements to facilitate information sharing and collaboration across the community. These 
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requirements are derived from Unifying Intelligence Strategies (UIS), which serve as 
roadmaps for various high-priority geographic and/or topic areas, and are executed within the 
DDNI/II through National Intelligence Managers (NIMs) charged with regional and 
functional intelligence integration. Coordination for NIMs is organized under the National 
Security Partnerships Directorate. The creation of DDNI/II and NIMs promote synchronizing 
across the IC to support the outlined UIS, keeping the IC apprised of its goals and vision as 
set forth by ODNI. Finally, ODNI expanded the duties of the cross-community National 
Intelligence Analysis and Production Board to enhance clarity on overall intelligence strategy 
within the IC. The purpose of this board is to provide rapid, detailed policy advice to ensure 
message transparency between ODNI and the rest of the IC. (ODNI, 2011).  
ODNI currently mans a deputy NIM of the Western Hemisphere for the Homeland to 
handle all aspects of the Homeland threat picture. However, this role should be elevated to an 
actual functional/regional NIM in order to increase the focus on the homeland security 
mission and promote better integration into the enterprise (INSA, 2016). This new NIM role 
should incorporate DHS and FBI as key stakeholders in the National Network, as well as the 
new national strategy for domestic counterterrorism intelligence efforts to define focus areas 
and responsibilities (INSA, 2016). 
Addressing Intelligence Efficacy 
 ODNI has realized that the way to improve efficacy of intelligence products and the 
IC as a whole is to invest in robust training opportunities to improve analytic tradecraft 
throughout the community. ODNI has taken a number of measures to improve the quality of 
intelligence in this aspect. To begin, ODNI created nine standards for analytic tradecraft in 
ICD 203 to promote rigorous analytic thinking. Further, ODNI established the Analytic 
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Integrity and Standards (AIS) office under DDNI/II to evaluate the quality of IC products 
according to the standards they set (Rojas, 2016). AIS uses a sample of intelligence products 
and assesses them according to a published rating scale that measures: credibility of 
underlying sources, data, and methodologies; proper explanation of uncertainties in 
judgments, proper distinction between intelligence and assumptions or judgment; 
incorporation of alternative hypotheses; demonstration of customer relevance; logical 
argumentation; explanation of change or consistency of prior analytic judgment; accuracy of 
assessment; and incorporation of visual information for enhanced clarity (ICD 203). In 
addition, ODNI published the Rating Scale for Evaluating Analytic Tradecraft Standards to 
assist both evaluators and analysts in enhancing their tradecraft (Rojas, 2016). 
 ODNI also created “Analysis 101,” among other training courses, as part of the 
Analyst Professional Training Roadmap, a program comprised of courses from DHS, ODNI, 
and other organizations aimed at assisting SLTT analysts in refining their analytical skills 
(Global Advisory Committee, 2015). The Analysis 101 course includes 18 days of rigorous, 
joint training to equip analysts with the skills necessary to work according to ODNI’s 
analytic standards (DHS, 2008). Analysis 101 is part of the basic analytic course within the 
Roadmap that provides familiarity with analytic common competencies. This basic analytic 
course, which is voluntary for fusion center analysts as part of the Analyst Professional 
Training Roadmap introduces topics such as legal analytic issues, critical thinking, and 
collaboration and fusion across the IC. In the first 10 years of the program, there were more 
than 7,000 graduates from more than 30 organizations within the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities (Rojas, 2016). Further, ODNI created the IC Civilian Joint Duty 
program, winner of Harvard University’s 2008 Innovations in American Government Award. 
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This program aims to help the next generation of intelligence leaders to understand the scope 
and complexity of the IC by building perspective through cross-agency experiences and 
enabling the ability to engage vast IC resources to support the national intelligence mission 
(ICD 660, 2013). The program gives its students leadership experience in policy, operations, 
and analysis with various IC elements as well as relevant organizations outside of the IC. 
Finally, the creation of NIMs allow for quick response to the intelligence needs of 
policymakers and identification of intelligence gaps throughout the IC (ODNI, 2011). 
In order to improve effectiveness of fusion center intelligence, analytic standards 
should be created to govern the National Network. The standards ODNI created in ICD 203 
serve the IC well in professionalizing intelligence and enhancing analytic tradecraft, but there 
is no way to enforce these standards among fusion centers due to limitations in authorities 
(Bruce & George, 2015). Even so, the contents of ICD 203 should form a strong basis for 
analytic training efforts within the National Network (Pherson, 2013).  
These ICD 203-driven standards should pave the way for the creation of an analyst 
training and certification program for the National Network. Since no one organization has 
created nor taken ownership of a mandatory certification process for the National Network, 
ODNI could be the best fit to take on this responsibility as they have made significant 
progress in establishing analytic capabilities throughout the IC through training 
opportunities, such as their Analyst 101 contribution to the Analyst Professional 
Development Roadmap. By tapping ODNI as the lead for professionalizing intelligence 
within the National Network, analytic tradecraft could be improved in three areas: promoting 
intelligence analysis standards; offering education, continuation training and outreach efforts; 
and creating certification requirements. These efforts are important to narrow the wide 
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variation in analytic competence and improve the quality and relevance of intelligence 
(Bruce & George, 2015).  
Part of standardizing intelligence capabilities is developing a “common lexicon” for 
many of the key concepts that differ among entities within the National Network, such as 
national, homeland security, and law enforcement intelligence and information, among other 
ideas. With ODNI taking the lead for this effort, they can ensure all entities in the National 
Network are focused on homeland security work from the same play book (Rollins, 2008). 
Also important in standardization is setting and prioritizing intelligence requirements for 
collection and analysis, which should be addressed in the strategy and policy that defines the 
domestic counterterrorism intelligence mission. Doing so enables fusion centers to 
collaborate on a common mission and ensure any products they create inform national 
intelligence efforts.  
Addressing Intelligence Oversight and Accountability 
 The responsibility to protect privacy and civil liberties of the American public is a 
huge responsibility throughout the IC; as a result, ODNI established the Civil Liberties and 
Privacy Office (CLPO) to provide guidance, policy clarification, and accountability on 
critical missions dealing with collection, cybersecurity, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA), and more. This office, governed by ICD 107, pushes out the Civil Liberties and 
Privacy Intelligence Community Enterprise Strategy (2012-2017), helps to assure oversight 
entities that intelligence personnel are performing their duties while still protecting individual 
rights and complying with other regulations (ODNI, 2011), and is part of the broader, multi-
layered U.S. oversight framework.  The strategy includes four main goals: ensuring that all 
IC policy, procedures and programs incorporate the protection of civil liberties and privacy; 
FIXING FUSION CENTER INTELLIGENCE UNDER THE ODNI 33 
establishing privacy compliance programs throughout the IC; ensuring that privacy and civil 
liberties complaints are properly investigated; and providing the government and the 
American people transparency into the IC’s efforts to protect privacy and civil liberties.  
 The last goal of this strategy was addressed through ODNI’s establishment of the 
Intelligence Transparency Council in 2016 (ODNI, 2011). This internal forum, birthed 
through a five-year charter signed by James Clapper, includes a representative from each of 
the 17 IC agencies that work together to identify possible new intelligence topics in need of 
more transparency. The mission of this council is to ensure the public understands the 
authorities and oversight mechanisms that guide the IC (Aftergood, 2016). 
 Because of the variances in state regulations regarding privacy and civil liberties, it is 
suggested that all states and the National Network adopt the same highly-scrutinized, already 
well-written, and mostly publicly-transparent P/CRCL policies and guidance that ODNI uses 
to govern the IC. In doing so, the National Network would be assured that their work would 
at least align with the stringent baseline national P/CRCL requirements that promote personal 
protection of the highest degree to the American people. A uniform, well-written privacy 
policy adopted by all fusion centers would “force fusion centers to examine and document 
legal authorities for undertaking various activities. It will then become the standard to which 
they train and hold their employees,” reducing the “likelihood that centers will use their 
powers inconsistent with their authorities” (Harper, 2009). 
Addressing Vertical and Horizontal Collaboration 
 As program manager for the 17 entities that make up the IC, ODNI invests 
considerable effort in promoting integration and information sharing. PM-ISE, under ODNI’s 
National Security Partnerships Directorate, leads the effort for establishing information 
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sharing and accessibility standards and processes for all federal, SLTT, and private sector 
entities. ODNI also created the IC Information Sharing Executive to lead the effort in finding 
ways to improve information sharing and reduce unnecessary legal impediments to 
information sharing while protecting P/CRCL. Further, ODNI created ICD 501 to boost IC 
integration and information sharing by requiring collected and analyzed information to be 
electronically available to the rest of the IC. As a result, the virtual Library of National 
Intelligence now contains more than 10 million analytic products and is accessible to more 
than 100,000 IC personnel (ODNI, 2011). 
ODNI’s efforts with coordinating intelligence strategy and responsibilities within the 
IC to prevent duplication of efforts should be utilized to do the same for the National 
Network. PM-ISE’s and the IC Information Sharing Executive’s progress in establishing 
accessibility standards that also address P/CRCL concerns should continue to enhance the 
fusion center information sharing process.  
 ODNI also invests tremendous effort in improving information sharing across the IC 
enterprise through databases and other information systems designed to mitigate duplication 
of effort. ODNI’s Enterprise Capacity Directorate created online collaborative platforms, 
such as Intellipedia and A-Space to connect analysts working on similar issues. These efforts 
proved fruitful in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, when a group of analysts 
convened on these platforms to share real-time photos and video during the event to identify 
the group that perpetrated the attack. Both platforms were praised by Time Magazine as 
some of 2008’s best inventions (ODNI, 2011). Finally, specific to the National Network, 
ODNI improved information sharing by brokering SIPRNet access to clearance holders in 72 
of 78 fusion centers in support of the homeland security mission (ODNI, 2011).  
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ODNI’s contribution to mitigating duplication of effort and promoting vertical and 
horizontal collaboration within the IC makes them primed to assist the National Network in 
doing the same. Currently, the National Network utilizes a variety of DHS and FBI databases 
with duplicate information. Tasking an unbiased entity such as ODNI’s PM-ISE to 
streamline these systems would remove the potential for competition from either entity in the 
process and make information dissemination both vertically and horizontally within the 
National Network more efficient and effective. 
Further, ODNI has promoted security clearance interoperability to enhance the 
information sharing environment. ODNI accomplished half of the policy and technology 
projects in the Clearance Reform Strategic Plan to encourage faster clearance timelines and 
enhanced clearance reciprocity throughout the intelligence enterprise. ODNI also created the 
Intelligence Community Badge Interoperability Program (ICBIP) to help IC personnel attain 
easier access to facilities outside of their workspace. Since its creation ICBIP has helped 
improve collaboration between the Department of State, Homeland Security and the 
Treasury. The common badge system allows for easier information passage among agencies 
without the need to pass clearances. These efforts to promote security clearance 
interoperability to enhance the information sharing environment is much needed within the 
National Network. ODNI’s efforts to reform the security clearance process within the IC 
should be mirrored for fusion centers. Similar to efforts with streamlining databases, using 
ODNI as a non-partisan entity for promoting faster security clearance processing times and 
interoperability between agencies would serve the National Network well.   
Discussion 
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 As mentioned previously, finding a cookie cutter approach to a decentralized and 
non-standardized network of fusion centers is neither ideal nor 100 percent practical. It is 
widely known that ODNI does not possess the authority to be in charge of the National 
Network, which is operated at the state level. Similarly, there are different regulations for 
different stakeholders. For example, the IC is not able to task state, local, tribal, and 
territorial entities because of major differences in legal authorities. Further, ODNI is far from 
faultless and improvements to the intelligence structure is a continual work in progress. 
There are still critical assessments regarding ODNI acting as another bureaucratic layer 
within the IC muddle. However, one can argue that there is no better authority within the IC 
to handle these types of widespread inefficiencies. “No other official has the stature or 
mandate to do so and the role of the ODNI is already one of coordination and integration of 
agencies with disparate authorities and missions” (Homeland Security Intelligence Council, 
2016).  
 Perhaps a fair compromise to the issue of authority is to organize and create the roles 
and functions of a national intelligence manager for homeland security under DHS. The new 
organization and roles would still be placed under DHS I&A since they are already charged 
with the intelligence functions of the National Network mission, but would mirror the ODNI-
type roles and functions under the DHS I&A. However, doing so would involve a huge 
cultural shift within DHS to improve management at all levels and speed up their timeline for 
affecting change, two major issues that have plagued the department since its onset. In 
addition, the lack of manpower and funding within DHS currently prevents them from 
heading in this direction, even if they wanted to (Painter, 2019). Increasing the roles and 
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responsibilities of I&A is a major building block for DHS to proactively take responsibility 
of their failures and set a true benchmark for National Network efficacy and success.  
 To conclude, the National Network was created with good intention to facilitate 
intelligence and information sharing throughout the federal, state, and local levels. While its 
limited success can be contributed to each center’s decentralized approach and regional-
specific expertise and ability to respond to local problem sets, fusion centers have faced a 
number of challenges due to their lack of centralization and standardization. These issues 
include a lack of standardized strategy and oversight, non-standardized intelligence processes 
and analytical training, and structural and organizational issues that prevent effective vertical 
and horizontal collaboration. Because the ODNI was created to deal with similar issues 
within the IC, they then can be looked at as a logical solution to deal with the same 
widespread inefficiencies within the National Network. However, a problem with differences 
in authorities at different governmental levels makes it difficult to assign these authorities to 
an entity such as ODNI, which is charged with making changes at the national level. This is 
the main counterargument against making ODNI responsible for this effort. Because of this 
issue, it is far more feasible to mirror ODNI’s roles and functions under DHS I&A in an 
NIM-type capacity, since DHS the proper authority over the National Network. In doing so, 
many of these challenges can be mitigated, leaving the National Network in a better position 
for interoperability and collaboration among its key stakeholders, to include DHS, FBI, and 
law enforcement on all levels.   
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